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THE "LAW OF THE CIRCUIT" AND ALL THAT
FOREWORD TO THE SECOND CIRCUIT
1970 TERm
On behalf of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, I thank St. John's Law Review for undertaking this series of
critical comments on our decisions.
Another university's law review published a note about our court
seven years ago.' Evidently it did not regard us as deserving continued
attention. Perhaps it was right; the proof of this new pudding will be
in the eating. Something will depend on us as well as on you, and
something on the sheer luck of the draw. St. John's thus ought not to
regard this promise, made without consideration, in the contractual
sense, as a commitment in perpetuo if the results should be disap-
pointing. The undertaking begins at a peculiarly interesting time since
five of the nine judges who were in "regular active service" 2 at the
beginning of the 1970 Term here under review took senior status3
either while the term was passing or before the following one was
well under way. Next year's article will doubtless report on how far
the changes in the court's membership are thought to have caused
differences in decision.4
Perhaps a series such as this and similar ones relating to other
circuits5 will help to resolve the identity crisis of judges of the federal
courts of appeals. The district courts know what their business is
1 Note, The Second Circuit: Federal Judicial Administration in Microcosm, 63 COLUM.
L. REv. 874 (1963).
2 28 U.S.C. § 43(b) (1970).
3 28 U.S.C. § 371(b) (1970). These judges, in order of their retirement, were Judges
Waterman, Moore, Anderson, Lumbard and Smith. Judges Oakes, Mansfield, Timbers
and Mulligan have succeeded the first four. At this writing no successor to Judge Smith
has yet been nominated.
4 The effect of the retirements on decision-making is happily blunted by the con-
tinued participation of the senior judges on panels, although not in voting whether
to hear or rehear a case en banc, or on an en bane court unless the senior judge was
on the panel that first heard the case. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1970).
5 See 4 SUFFOLK L. REV. 301 (1970), and 5 SUFFOLK L. REV. 565 (1971) (First Circuit);
2 U. TOL. L. REv. 49 (1970) (Sixth Circuit); 11 ARiz. L. REv. 551 (1969) (Ninth Circuit);
21 HASTINGs L. RPv. 863 (1970) (Ninth Circuit); 60 GEo. L.J. 281 (1971) (criminal cases
of all circuits, with emphasis on the D.C. Circuit). The Harvard Law Review, under the
inspiration of Professor Frankfurter, as he then was, preempted the Supreme Court long
ago, first with a series of articles, Frankfurter & Landis, Frankfurter & Hart, Frankfurter
& Fisher, and Hart, The Business of the Supreme Court, HARV. L. REv. 43:33, 44:1, 45:271,
46:226, 47:245, 48:238, 49:68, 51:577, and 53:579 (for the terms 1928-38) and then with an
annual review by the editors, The Supreme Court, 1948 Term, 63 HARv. L. REv. 119
(1949). I understand that St. John's initiative with respect to our circuit is now to be
followed by the Brooklyn Law Review.
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disposing of cases by trial or settlement with fairness and with the
optimum blend of prompt decision and rightness of result;6 they also
have the responsibility of demonstrating the quality of federal justice
to ordinary citizens - parties, witnesses and jurors. The Supreme Court
knows what its business should be - deciding serious questions of fed-
eral law. All these functions are obviously of the highest importance
and their discharge accordingly satisfying.
The role of the federal courts of appeals is more ambiguous. If a
case involves questions of federal law of such importance as to be re-
viewed by the Supreme Court, the views of the court of appeals count,
and should count, for little. I am unable to share the view, expressed
on occasion by some polite Justices and entertained by some of my
colleagues, that we have much to contribute in such cases; I doubt
whether many of the Justices even read our opinions, at least on con-
stitutional issues, except as these are filtered through the briefs of
counsel or the memoranda of law clerks. Indeed, I think the Court
should make more use of its power to grant certiorari before decision
in the court of appeals 7 and thereby shorten the unduly long period
required for the determination of issues that may affect large numbers
of cases in the lower courts.8 With the great run of less important
6 Perhaps it may seem shocking thus to suggest there should ever be compromise in
the goal of attaining perfection. But the nature of the tasks of trial courts sets limits
on their abilities to achieve this. Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are the most
obvious instance where quick decision is essential. Beyond that I do not believe the
greatest district judges to be those who stew for months and then write a long opinion
on a novel point of law concerning which they are almost certain not to have the last
word.
728 U.S.C. § 1254(l) (1970). Perhaps in order to encourage this and yet avoid undue
imposition on the Court's time, the right to seek certiorari in advance of decision by
a court of appeals should be limited to the United States, whether it has lost or won
in the district court. Appeal may be taken directly to the Supreme Court from a judg-
ment holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional in an action to which the United
States was a party. 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1970).
8 Making the optimistic assumption that the appeal is brought on for argument in
the court of appeals within the time limits prescribed by the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, four months will have elapsed after the filing of the notice of appeal. If the
court of appeals takes its job seriously, one could hardly expect an opinion in an impor-
tant case in less than two months after final submission. Such cases are prime candidates
for petitions for rehearing and suggestions for rehearing en banc. This is likely to
take another month at minimum - considerably more if rehearing en banc is granted.
Depending on the nature of the case, two to five months more will elapse before a
petition for certiorari is ready for action. SuPapxmE CouRT RuLas 22 & 24. If certiorari is
granted, the Court allows another two and a half months for briefs. Moreover, unless
certiorari is granted rather early in the Supreme Court's term, the case is not likely to
be reached for argument until the next term. This means at least two years' delay, and
probably more, from the decision of a district court to that of the Supreme Court. Of
course, the courts can act much more rapidly - perhaps indeed too rapidly-but such
cases are rare. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971);
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"federal" cases that still present new issues concerning the appropriate
rule of law, the Supreme Court has usually come close enough to the
problem that our principal function is that of "a reflector, serving as
a judicial moon."9 In appeals involving state-created rights, our role
is even less dignified; we are "only the little dog seeking to make out
his master's voice."' 0 Whether our utterance in such cases is an echo,
as it generally is, or a prophecy, the job is not very satisfying. Worst
of all, most appeals do not involve any new issues of law, but only the
application of established rules or questions of fact, and many are
frivolous, or nearly so.
That in 1971 the Supreme Court granted certiorari in only 18 cases
out of a thousand we decided, and over three hundred in which certio-
rari was sought," affords little basis for self-congratulation. The three
hundred denials are less a tribute to our sagacity than a shocking illus-
tration of the failure of the bar to pay the slightest heed to the Court's
announced criteria.12 Any court of appeals judge worthy of the name
who contemplates the reams of necessarily pedestrian opinions being
poured into the Federal Reporter must thus have asked himself on some
occasions whether what he was doing was worth the effort and financial
sacrifice or, alternatively and more productively, whether he and his
colleagues could restructure their time allotments so as to increase their
contribution to the growth of the law.
These nagging doubts concerning the role of the court of appeals
judge have been intensified by two developments of the last decade.
One is the sharp increase in the business of these courts, an increase
far exceeding the growth in the business of the district courts. In 1961,
when the Second Circuit had a complement of six judges in regular
active service, augmented by four rather active seniors, 674 appeals
were commenced.' 3 For 1971, when the court had a complement of nine
judges in regular active service but, at the beginning of the term, only
one senior, the corresponding figure was 1423.14 The explosive growth
occurred between 1967 and 1970, with an increase from 979 to 1343.15
United Steelworkers of America v. United States, 361 US. 39 (1959); Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
9 Choate v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 684, 686 (2d Cir. 1962) (Frank, J.).
10 Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking, Judges Who Can't and Legislators Who Won't.
63 CoLumn. L. Rm. 787, 789 (1963), reprinted in BENCHMARKS 41, 43 (1967).
11 1971 ANN. REP. or DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, Tables B1 & B2. [hereinafter A.O. ANN. REP.] All figures are for "fiscal years,"
i.e., years ending on June 30.
12SUPREME COURT RuLE 19.
131961 A.O. ANN, REP., Table B3.




While we are exceeded in filings by the geographically bloated Fifth
and Ninth Circuits, we have had the highest load of any circuit per
judge in regular active service.16 To some extent this is a self-inflicted
wound, since we have resisted requesting the added judgeships which
our figures would have justified. We have done this because of our
belief that an increase in the size of the court would augment the
difficulty of maintaining consistency of decision, great enough in any
court sitting in panels,17 and of conducting en banc proceedings, and
also because of the increased judge-power anticipated from the addi-
tion of five senior judges and of some streamlining of procedures which
we may be able to accomplish with the aid of the newly authorized
circuit executive.' 8 The 1971 decline in the rate of increase in filings
affords the first ray of hope that we may be able to hold the line, al-
though it is too early to tell whether we have reached a plateau or still
have steep rises ahead. Whatever the future may hold, we now some-
times feel we are working on an assembly line rather than with the
peace and quiet- and the opportunity to throw draft opinions into
the wastebasket - which Mr. Justice Frankfurter deemed essential to
the proper discharge of appellate responsibilities. 9
The other development has been a dramatic change in the consist
of our work. This has two phases: in 1961 only 101 criminal appeals
were filed out of our total of 674;20 a decade later these had grown to
362 out of 1423,21 an increase in proportion from 15 percent to 25.5 per-
cent. However, in order to appreciate the degree of our concentration on
criminal business, one must add to the latter figure 51 motions to vacate
sentence, 18 habeas corpus and 10 other petitions by federal prisoners,
and 94 habeas corpus, 26 civil rights, and 3 other petitions by state pris-
oners.22 This creates a total of 564 cases essentially criminal in nature -
approximately 40 percent of our total. We are by no means unique in
this; as I remarked a year ago after surveying the nationwide figures,
10 Although Table 4 of the A.O. Ann. Rep. shows a higher number for the Fourth
Circuit, the figures for that circuit are distorted by its practice of including all state
prisoner applications for review as appeals, whether or not a certificate of probable cause
has been granted as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (1970). Compare 1971 A.O. ANN. REP.,
Table B7.
17The statute creating the courts of appeals contemplated only three judges in
each circuit. 26 Stat. 826 (1891). Once a court exceeds five judges, there is a possibility
that one panel may decide in ignorance of the pendency of the same issue before another,
unless opinions are circulated to all the judges.
1828 U.S.C. § 352(e) (1970).
10 See Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437, 458-59 (1959) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
20 1961 A.O. ANN. Rae., TABaL Bl.
211971 A.O. ANN. REP., TABLE Bl.
221971 A.O. ANN. REP., T.LE B7.
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[i]t is not generally realized to what extent the courts of appeals
are becoming criminal courts. 23
Since such appeals only rarely present issues concerning the proper
principle of law, as distinguished from the application of established
rules or the sufficiency of the evidence, the increased proportion of time
required to be devoted to criminal matters does not enhance the role
of a court of appeals judge in the federal judicial system.
The other phase is the increased number of appeals in actions
under the Civil Rights Act.24 Judge Coffin has compiled an impres-
sive list of the variety of questions under this head of jurisdiction
presented to the First Circuit in its 1969 Term.25 No one can say
these appeals lack interest or importance; indeed, they are among
the most important with which a federal court can deal. What is frus-
trating is that so often they involve a confrontation of right against
right, and require a decision that is essentially political. For instance,
assuming the funds for relief to be finite, declaring a required period
of residence to be unconstitutional means less money for people having
a longer identification with the state,26 and holding a ceiling on family
allowances, despite the number of children, to be unconstitutional
would have decreased the allowance to families that had shown more
restraint in procreation. 27 Again, assuming the funds that can be de-
voted to public education to be finite, a decision that a state must
afford free elementary education to a retarded child, no matter what
the expense, means less money for the education of other children. 2
In many of these cases, perhaps even in most, anyone who truly thinks
that either the words or the spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment cast
any real light is indulging in dangerous self-deception.
29
While it is tempting to say that such decisions are better left to
state administrative or legislative bodies, our legal system requires the
courts to deal with them except in the unlikely event that states should
choose to give maximum recognition to all demands. All one can hope
23 Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38
U. CHI. L. REv. 142, 144 n.9 (1970).
2442 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) and its jurisdictional implementation, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)
(1970). The 105 appeals to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals under this statute in 1971
constitute only a partial reflection of such litigation in which circuit judges participate;
many such actions require the convening of three-judge district courts pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2281 (1970). We had 18 of these during 1971. A.O. ANN. RrP., Table 36.
25 Coffin, Justice and Workability: Un Essai, 5 SUFFOLK L. Rav. 567, 469-70 (1971).
26 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
27 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
28 Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, - F. Supp. - (E.D. Pa.
1971) (order by consent).
29 To take another instance, the constitutionality of statutes making abortion a
crime. E.g., Corky v. Edwards, 322 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
[Vol. 46:406
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is that somewhat greater, and faster, response to social stresses by state
executive and legislative bodies will lessen the extent to which the
federal judiciary must make what in reality are political decisions. In
this area we are peculiarly a halfway house; many of our decisions are
likely to end up in the Supreme Court.
The case for a series of studies such as this Review is undertaking
is therefore one that needs making. In my view, the really important
work of the courts of appeals, other than as mere dispatchers of busi-
ness, inheres in a relatively small number of cases each year. These
present significant issues of federal law, not controlled by Supreme
Court decisions, which have not previously arisen in the circuit but
which the Supreme Court will not regard as so important as to justify
intervention until a conflict has arisen or, sometimes, even when it has.
I should guess that each term would see a score of such decisions -
perhaps either "by reason of strength" or by using a less rigorous
standard - two score, out of nearly a thousand cases disposed of after
hearing or submission.
Leaving last term's decisions to the editors, I will cite two ex-
amples of what I mean. In United States v. DeSisto,30 we held that
testimony given at a former trial or before a grand jury by a witness
who was on the stand and subject to cross-examination could be used
not simply for impeachment but as affirmative proof of the facts stated,
although a good argument could be made that testimony at a former
trial should not be so usable since the witness was not "unavailable"
and grand jury testimony should not be for the further reason that it
was not subject to cross-examination at the time. While it was also
arguable that our ruling ran counter to a Supreme Court decision
which we distinguished,31 the Court denied certiorari. We have con-
tinued to apply what Professor Chadbourn calls "the Second Circuit
view"3 2 with what we think to be good results. No circuit has yet
followed us; one has declined to do so;33 and others have been able
to avoid a decision. 34 Now the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence
would go far beyond our decision, dangerously and wrongly so, and
allow such use of any prior utterance by a witness, even an oral one
which he denies having made.35
My second example is a view, developed in our circuit long be-
30 329 F.2d 929 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 877 U.S. 979 (1964).
31 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 153-54 (1945).
32 3A WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1018 at 996-98 n.2 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
33 Byrd v. United States, 342 F.2d 939, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
34 United States v. Classen, 424 F.2d 494, 495 n.1 (6th Cir. 1970); United States v.
Schwartz, 290 F.2d 1, 5-6 (3d Cir. 1968).
35 PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE Rule 801(d)(1). See United States v. Cunning-
ham, 446 F.2d 194, 198 (2d Cir. 1971).
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fore my time, that a trial judge's conclusion with respect to negligence
is not a "finding of fact" within the protection of the "unless clearly
erroneous" rule.30 Six years ago we reexamined this in the light of an
earnest argument that our doctrine ran counter to a later Supreme
Court decision37 and decided it did not.38 Here we are in clear conflict
with other circuits.s9 Yet the Court has been willing to leave the con-
flict unresolved. 40
What I have just written leads directly to my final point, namely,
that a series such as this finds justification in the concept of the "law
of the circuit." Although the dimensions of this may have been exag-
gerated, it is true that the Supreme Court's inability to hear more than
a relatively few cases each term, its desire sometimes to let the dust
settle before moving in, and other factors permit each circuit to make
its own federal law in limited areas at least for a short time and occa-
sionally, as the foregoing examples show, for a long one.
This process can lead to forum-shopping, and also to difficulties
in cases transferred from one circuit to another,41 since I take the
Supreme Court's decision -42 that the transferee court is bound to apply
the same conflict of law rules as the transferor to be limited to choices
of state law. However pleasant it would be to share Judge Parker's an-
ticipation43 that all circuits will decide a question of federal law the
same way or be corrected by the Supreme Court if they don't, such a
view is mere wishful thinking. This is vividly demonstrated by the
differing results reached with respect to the very subject, patentability,
of which the judge was speaking.44 The Supreme Court's recent ex-
3 F. R. Civ. P. 52(a). We have added the gloss that the trial judge's conclusion "will
ordinarily stand unless the lower court manifests an incorrect conception of the appli-
cable law." Cleary v. United States Lines Co., 411 F.2d 1009, 1010 (2d Cir. 1969).
37 McAllister v. United States, 348 U.S. 19 (1954).
38 Mamiye Bros. v. Barber Steamship Lines, Inc., 860 F.2d 774, 776-78 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 885 U.S. 885 (1966).
39 Merritt v. Interstate Transit Lines, 171 F.2d 605, 608-09 (8th Cir. 1948); Imperial
Oil Co. v. Drlik, 284 F.2d 4, 10 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 852 U.S. 941 (1956); Pacific
Tow Boat Co. v. States Marine Corp., 276 F.2d 745, 752 (9th Cir. 1960). Several other
circuits generally oppose the Second Circuit view. See Weiner, The Civil Nonjury Trial
and the Law-Fact Distinction, 55 CAL. L. Rxv. 1020, 1024-1041 (1967).
40 The denial of certiorari in Mamiye Bros. was not significant since we affirmed the
district judge's conclusion of lack of negligence, although reasserting one power to re-
verse on something less than a "clearly erroneous" standard. But the Court has also denied
certiorari where, applying the "Second Circuit rule," we reversed a conclusion of negligence,
by an especially able judge, that would have necessarily been affirmed under the standard
applied by the Sixth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits, Esso Standard Oil Co. v. S.S. Gasbras Sul.,
887 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 891 U.S. 914 (1968).
4128 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970). Cf. Ackert v. Bryan, 299 F.2d 65, 71, 73 (2d Cir. 1962)
(dissenting opinions).
42Van Dusen v. Barrack, 876 U.S. 612 (1964).
43 Clayton v. Warlick, 282 F.2d 699, 706 (4th Cir. 1956).
44 See also Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to
the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARv. L. REv. 542, 596-604 (1969).
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tension of the rule of collateral- estoppel in patent cases,45 sound as I
think it to be, will mean that a patentee who has lost his case on valid-
ity in a circuit which is "tough" on patents will not have whatever
slight opportunity formerly existed to get a conflicting decision from
another more favorably disposed.
A presupposition of the "law of the circuit" concept is that a court
of appeals is not overly impressed by the fact that another has reached
a contrary conclusion. One circuit will follow another or others when
it is persuaded, has no strong views either way,46 or considers immediate
nationwide uniformity to be unusually important, but generally not
when it firmly believes the other circuit or circuits have been wrong.
The volume of precedents in each circuit and in the Supreme Court
has become so great that only rarely is it necessary to rely on opinions
of other circuits, 47 and a district court opinion is not likely to have an
impact merely as authority unless it comes from a judge enjoying
special esteem. The circuits have become increasingly ingrown or, if
one prefers a less pejorative term, self-contained. 48 Annual compendia
of their more important decisions are thus an important time-saver
to practitioners and district judges, as well as to the judges of the court
of appeals themselves.
Along with the value of having our opinions mercilessly dissected
and criticized,49 and, hopefully, of having some of their emanations de-
veloped, these factors are a sufficient justification for the difficult en-
terprise on which this law review is embarking. I wish it a long and
prosperous voyage.
HENRY J. FRIENDLY
Chief Judge, Second Circuit
45 Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S.
313 (1971).
46 Cf. United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 445 F.2d 520, 528 (2d Cir. 1971)
cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3399 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1972).
47 One is reminded of Holmes' remark that in a score of years the highest court of a
state would have written on almost all legal subjects and would have little need to look
elsewhere for precedents. In his later years he carried this a step further, rarely citing
opinions other than his own.
48 This is somewhat mitigated by the visits of judges of other circuits, from which
we benefit in many ways.
49 Although I thoroughly agree with Mr. Justice Brewer's observation "better all
sorts of criticism than no criticism at all," Government by Injunction, 15 NAT. CoRP. RP.
848, 849 (1898), I do pray some indulgence for the, court of appeals' judge who in a
single term may be obliged to write fifty or more opinions ranging from admiralty and
bankruptcy to workmen's compensation and zoning. We cannot be as expert as the ex-
perts on everything, and we generally do not get the help we should from counsel. See
Friendly, Reactions of a Lawyer Newly Become Judge, 71 YALE IJ, 218, 219-22 (1961),
reprinted in B-mcmr, s 1, 3-6 (1967).
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